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Abstract
This paper focuses on debates between Soekarno, Natsir and Nurcholish Madjid
to whether Indonesian state should be based on Islam ideologically or not.
Soekarno, was in favor of the separation between Islam and state and against
the idea of a formal-legal relationship between them. In Soekarno’s belief, by
separating religion from the state, it does not mean that Islamic teachings are
automatically marginalized. Natsir argued against Soekarno’s idea that Islam
should be separated from the state. Natsir believed that Islam is a way of life in
which it not only guides Muslim peoples on ritual matter but also on worldly
matters including how to manage a state. Madjid seems to propose the middle
path between Soekarno and Natsir in his struggle to ‘Islamize’ Indonesia. On
the one hand, Madjid opposes the idea of making Indonesia an Islamic state,
and on the other hand, Madjid also refuses that Indonesian become totally a
secular state. Madjid tried to develop a new format for political Islam in which
substance, rather than form, serves as his primary orientations.
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Kajian ini berfokus pada perdebatan antara Soekarno, Natsir dan Nurcholish
Madjid tentang apakah negara Indonesia harus didasarkan pada Islam ideologis
atau tidak. Soekarno adalah pendukung pemisahan antara Islam dan negara
dan menentang gagasan hubungan formal-legal antara keduanya. Dalam
keyakinan Soekarno, dengan memisahkan agama dari negara, itu tidak berarti
bahwa ajaran Islam secara otomatis terpinggirkan. Natsir menentang gagasan
Soekarno bahwa Islam harus dipisahkan dari negara. Natsir percaya bahwa
Islam adalah cara hidup yang tidak hanya membimbing masyarakat Muslim
tentang masalah ritual tetapi juga pada hal-hal duniawi termasuk bagaimana
mengelola negara. Madjid tampaknya mengusulkan jalan tengah antara
Soekarno dan Natsir dalam perjuangan untuk ‘mengislamkan’ Indonesia. Di
satu sisi, Madjid menentang ide menciptakan Indonesia sebagai negara Islam,
dan di sisi lain, Madjid juga menolak bahwa Indonesia menjadi benar-benar
sebuah negara sekuler. Madjid mencoba untuk mengembangkan format baru
bagi Islam politik di mana substansi, bukan bentuk, berfungsi sebagai orientasi
utamanya.
Keywords: Islamic State; Jakarta Charter; Soekarno;  Natsir; Nurcholish Madjid
Introduction
The issue of Islam and state relations has become a central debate in
Indonesia even since the state formation process prior to the declaration
of independence in 1945. During this period the founding fathers of
Indonesia were engaged in an intense debate of the basis of the state.
The debate reflects deep-seated ideological and political divisions between
kebangsaan groups (secular nationalists) who preferred a non-theocratic
form of the state and the Islamic groups who argued for the Islamic state.1
On the one hand, the leading figures of the kebangsaan group were rep-
resented by Soekarno, Sutan Sjahrir2 and Muhammad Hatta,3 and Is-
1 Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003,  1.
2 Sutan Sjahrir (5 March 1909 — 9 April 1966) was the first prime minister of Indone-
sia, after a career as a key Indonesian nationalist movement figure in the 1930s and 1940s.
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lamic groups, on the other hand, were represented by Natsir,4 H.O.S.
Cokroaminoto,5 and Abdul Moeis. Since both groups mostly consisted of
Sjahrir was born in 1909 in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra; He helped set up the Indone-
sian National Party (PNI), and became a close associate of future vice president Mohammad
Hatta. He was imprisoned by the Dutch for nationalist activities in November 1934, first in
Boven Digul, then on Banda, and then in 1941, just before the Indies fell to the Japanese, to
Sukabumi. He was appointed Prime Minister by President Sukarno in November 1945 and
served until June 1947. Sjahrir founded the Indonesian Socialist Party in 1948, which,
although small, was very influential in the early post-independence years, because of the
expertise and high education levels of its leaders. But the party performed poorly in the
1955 elections and was banned by President Sukarno in 1960. Sjahrir was jailed in the early
1960s, and died in exile in Zürich, Switzerland in 1966. See Anderson, Benedict R. O’G.
Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1972 and also http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Sutan-Syahrir.
3 Muhammad Hatta (1902-1980), Indonesian nationalist leader and vice president.
Born on 12 August 1902 in Bukittinggi, Sumatra, he studied in the Netherlands, where he
obtained a doctorate in economics in 1932. Returning to Indonesia, he became active in the
Indonesian nationalist movement and was arrested by the After World War II, Hatta
became vice president under Sukarno of the Indonesian Republic they declared. Dutch in
1934, and was imprisoned on the island of Bandanaira. He was released by the Japanese in
1942. The Dutch resisted the nationalists, and Hatta became premier and defense minister
in 1948 to direct the fight against the Dutch troops. Again imprisoned by the Dutch in
1949, Hatta was released to head a delegation to the Hague and there successfully negoti-
ated a settlement. He was (1949-50) again prime minister before serving (1950-56) as vice
president of the republic; he resigned 1956 after a dispute with Sukarno. Hatta withdrew
from political life and devoted himself primarily to the cooperative movement in Indonesia.
After Sukarno’s fall from power, Hatta returned to government service as an adviser to
President Suharto.  See his Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings (1973) and also see http://
www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Hatta-Mo.html
4 His personal details and political thought will be explained in this chapter.
5 Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto popularly known as HOS Tjokroaminoto (August
16, 1882 – December 17, 1934) was a nationalist, the first leader of Sarekat Dagang Islam
(Islamic Trade Union, later Sarekat Islam) in Indonesia. Born in Madiun as the son of RM.
Tjokroaminoto (district chief of Kleco). When H. Samanhoedi had founded Sarekat Dagang
Islam (SDI, in the late 1911). Tjokroaminoto was asked to prepare needed regulations for
organization and next management handling. After that the statuten (statute) was prepared
and strengthened by notarial act in Surabaya (September 10, 1912). The word Dagang
(trade) in the organization’s name was removed and SDI became SI (Sarekat Islam; Islamic
Union). Its chairman was H. Samanhoedi, while Tjokroaminoto became commissioner
Because of rapid development of local SIs, it was necessary to establish a central SI coordi-
nating them. On 1915, the Centraal Sarekat Islam (CSI) was founded with Tjokroaminoto
as its chairman, Abdoel Moeis as its vice-chairman, and Samanhoedi as honorary chair
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Muslim individuals, for Effendy, the two groups’ division should be seen
in the light of political categories instead of religious.
In my view, the fundamental differences between the Muslims who
aspired for the development of Islam as a political category and the
Muslim who favoured Islam as moral or ethical underpinning in their
ideological-political ventures lay not so much on the degree of religious
devotions (or faith), but on the way they interpreted and understood
the messages of Islam…therefore, even having to reject the idea of an
Islamic state, individuals like Soekarno and Hatta were no less Islamic
than their Muslim counterparts who strived for an Islamic state.6
The same as Effendy, Anwar argues that these two different opinions
in political Islam in the world, including in Indonesia was influenced by
their interpretation and understanding of the message of Islam. Anwar
classifies these two groups into legal exclusive and substantive-inclusive. While
the former refers to the idea that Islam is not only a religion but also a
complete legal system, universal ideology, and a perfect system of guidance;
the former refers to the notion that Islam as a religion does not stipulate
any theoretical concepts related to politics and the Quran only contains
information about aspects of ethical or moral guidance for human life.7
Hosen called these two groups as formal and substantive shariah groups.8
man. Since then Tjokroaminoto was continuously chairman or member of SI Board of
Administration until his death. When the CSI became weak, and its name was changed to
PSI (Partai Sarekat Islam; Islamic Union Party) on February 1923. Later PSI was changed
to PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party) in early 1929.
There was a confrontation between nationalist Soekiman and religious Tjokroaminoto
that led to Soekiman’s discharge to form a new party, Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian
Islamic Party). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tjokroaminoto.
6Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2003, 55.
7M. Syafi’i Anwar, “Shari’a, Pluralism and the Prospect of democracy in Post Soeharto
Indonesia”, paper presented at EU-Indonesia Day Conference on Pluralism and Democracy:
Indonesian Perspective, Brussels, 7 December, 2006, 4-5.
8Nadirsyah Hosen, Syariah and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia (1999-2002), PhD
thesis at National University of Singapore, 2005, 56.
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Based on the background above, this paper discusses debates between
Soekarno and Natsir followed by discussion of Nurcholish Madjid’s view
to whether Indonesian state should be based on Islam ideologically and
how this debate has been followed by Islamic civil society groups and
political parties in the country afterward. Such debates of inclusion of
the Jakarta Charter into the Indonesian constitution and the debate to
whether Indonesia should be an Islamic state or state which separate
religion from state affairs have colored Indonesia political history up to
present.
The ideas of these three figures are important to be discussed due to
several reasons. Firstly, the polemic among them reflects the ideological
‘fight’ between two big groups in the Indonesian history and the con-
tents of the polemic are very fundamental and seems to be never ending
debate even after Indonesian independence up to present.9 Secondly,
Soekarno and Natsir could be seen as the leading political figures in the
political history of Indonesia while Nurcholish could be seen as a leading
Muslim intellectual who do not agree with both Natsir and Soekarno in
using political party as ‘a tool’ to promote his idea. Soekarno, on the one
hand, has significantly colored the development of political thinking in
pre-independence era up to contemporary Indonesia. It suffices to say
that Indonesian nationalism; more or less was based on Soekarno’s po-
litical thought. Natsir, on the other hand, is very identical with Islamic
political figure and has dominated Islamic political thinking in Indone-
sia. That is why Feith and Castle call Natsir as a ‘reformist Islam’:
 “As an ideology addressing itself to contemporary political affairs,
Indonesian Islam has been dominated by the ideas of the reformists,
9 It can be seen from the fact that even after Soeharto’s period, there are debates among
Muslims to include the Islamic sharia into Indonesian constitution.
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and reformism has been typified by the thinking of the former Masjumi
chairman, Mohammad Natsir”.10
Soekarno: Islam and state should be separated
The polemic between Soekarno and Natsir on Islam and state relation-
ship were begun when Soekarno wrote his article entitled ‘Apa Sebab
Turki Memisah Agama dari Negara”? (Why has Turkey Separated Religion
from the State?) in Pandji Islam magazine in 1940.11 As claimed by
Soekarno, this article was written by him as his answer to accommodate
the readers of the magazine who requested him to write more on Islamic
issues particularly after Soekarno’s writing entitled “Memudakan Pengertian
Islam” (Rejuvenating our Concepts of Islam) in the same magazine was
very welcomed by the readers.
Soekarno, basically was in favor of the separation between Islam and
state and against the idea of a formal-legal relationship between them.
Quoted and reformulated the ideas of Halide Edib Hanaoum, Soekarno
wrote:
“…religion needs to be liberated from the guidance of the state, in
order that it may prosper. If Islam is threatened with lost of influence
over the Turkish people that is not because it is not attended by the
government, but precisely because it was attended to by the govern-
ment. The followers of Islam were chained hand and foot to the poli-
tics of that government. This was a very big obstacle to the prospering
of Islam in Turkey…and not only in Turkey but anywhere…12
10Herbert Feith and Lance Castle, Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1970, 203.
11 This article was reprinted in Soekarno’s Under the Banner of Revolution, Vol. 1, Jakarta:
Publication Committee, 1966, 387-427. My discussion on Soekarno’s side on this polemic
is mostly based on and referred to this book.
12 Soekarno, Under the Banner of Revoluion..., 388.
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Soekarno also repeated the idea of Mahmud Essad Bey who believes
that religion should be separated from the state because under the state
or ruling government, religion would be easily misused for political pur-
poses particularly by the kings and authoritarian regime. Thus, in the
modern era, separated worldly matter (state) from the spiritual matter
(religion) could save the state from disaster and at the same time give an
honorable position to religion. In this, Soekarno then cited Kemal Ataturk
who says:
I liberated Islam from its bond to the state, so that Islam would not
remain a religion just of turning beads (tasbih) in the mosque but would
become a movement leading to struggle.13
For Soekarno, the purpose of Turki’s founding fathers like Ataturk
and Bey to separate Islam from state in Turkey was not to disgrace Is-
lamic teaching but conversely to negate and liberate Islam from its ob-
stacles to progress such as authoritarian and narrow-minded ruling
government’s view on Islam. He says:
“...the freeing of religion from the ties of the state also means the
freeing of the state from conservative religious opinions, that is, the
freeing of the state from traditional laws and orthodox Muslim con-
cepts which are in fact in conflict with the true spirit of Islam, and
which clearly have always been obstacles to the activities of the state
leading to progress and modernity. Islam has been separated from the
state in order that Islam may become free and that the state too may
become free. In order that Islam could develop by itself. In order that
Islam may prosper, and that the state too may prosper.14
Soekarno further says that this idea of separation between Islam and
state was not only implemented in Turkey but also in other countries
particularly in the Europe such as Netherlands, Germany, French, Bel-
13Soekarno, Under the Banner of Revoluion..., 389.
14Soekarno, Under the Banner of Revoluion..., 389.
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gium, and United Kingdom and also in the United States. To strengthen
his argument that Islam and state would be better to be separated,
Soekarno also cited the ideas of Muslim scholars which is popularly known
in Egypt at that time namely Shaikh Ali Abd al-Raziq15 who believes that
the argument of integration between Islam and state could not be found
in the Quran and Hadith and in the ijma of ulama (consensus among
Muslim scholars) because the main duty of the Prophet Muhammad was
not to establish Islamic state. Soekarno says:
In 1925, for instance, a book was published in Cairo written by Sheikh
Ali Abdul Razik, Al-Islam Wa Usul al Hukm, which set out to show that
the work of the prophet was merely to establish just a religion, with-
out any intention of setting up a state, a worldly government, also
without any obligation for there to be a caliph or a head of the Mus-
lims to handle state affairs.16
In Soekarno’s belief, by separating religion from the state, it does not
mean that Islamic teachings are automatically marginalized and can not
play their role in politics because in a democratic country, Muslim com-
munities can imbue Islamic values into state politics through their repre-
sentatives in the parliament. Soekarno states:
“…in a country where there is democracy and where there is a people’s
representative body which truly represents the people, in such a coun-
15 Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966) could be seen as the first Muslim scholar who advocates
secularism ideas in Islamic thinking. In his book al-Islam wa ‘Usul al-Hukm (Islam and State
Principles), published in 1925, a famous and controversial work, Abd al-Raziq asserted
that Islam was a religion and not a state, a message not a government, a spiritual edifice not
a political institution. For him, the Prophet was only a messenger and not a ruler, that he
preached a religion and not a state, and that the caliphate was not a part of Islamic dogmas.
Al-Raziq strictly denied the idea that Muhammad had established Islamic state. He believes
that the Prophet has never built an Islamic state in Medina. For him, Muhammad’s mission
was purely Allah’s messenger, neither a head of a state nor a political leader. See F. M Najjar,
“The debate on Islam and secularism in Egypt”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Volume 18, Number
2 (Spring 1996): 1(21).
16 Soekarno, Under the Banner of Revoluion ..., 390.
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try the people can nevertheless introduce all kinds of religious ele-
ments into any action of the state, into any laws in force in the state,
into any political action carried out by the state, even though religion
is separated from the state there. Provided only that the politics of the
greater part of the members of parliament are Islamic politics, not
even a single proposal that is not Islamic in nature will be able to
make its way. Are not the Christians in the parliament in Holland for
instance, free to pursue Christian politics?.17
Soekarno argues that in a democratic country, the state should not
officially insert ‘a religious state’ phrase in its constitution. He disagreed
with the idea of a formal-legal relationship between Islam and state in
Indonesia in which other religious believes in the multi ethnic and multi
cultural country existed. For Soekarno, the idea to make Indonesia as an
Islamic state are dangerous for a newly independence Indonesia which
will create a sense of discrimination for other non-Muslim communities.
In his article ‘Saya Kurang Dinamis (I am not Dynamic Enough), Soekarno
says:
“…those realities show us that the principle of unity of state and reli-
gion for a country whose population is not completely 100 per cent all
Islamic, cannot go side by side with democracy. For such a country
there are just two alternatives, there are only two things from which
one can be chosen: unity of state and religion but without democracy,
or democracy, but the state separated from religion.18
From the above discussion, it is clear that Soekarno agreed with the
idea of secularism which was at that time very popular in the Western
countries. For Soekarno, the political secularization that is to separate
religion from the state seems to be historically inevitable. Secularism as it
was implemented in Turkey, for Soekarno, could have very useful advan-
17 Soekarno, Under the Banner of Revoluion ..., 391.
18 Soekarno, Under the Banner of Revoluion..., 434 and see also Effendy, Islam and the
State …, 23.
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tages not only for the Turkey as a state but also for Islam as a religion. On
the one hand, Islam will not hamper the state to prosper and on the
other hand, the state (ruling government) will not misuse Islam for their
political purposes.
The ideas of Soekarno above have led to controversial debate among
Indonesian political activists during pre-Independence Indonesia. While
kebangsaan group supported Soekarno’s ideas, Islamic activists disagreed
and criticized Soekarno’s writings which according to them are very danger-
ous for the Islamic teachings and Islamic political development in the
country. For his opponents, Soekarno was accused to be weak and not
comprehensively understood Islamic doctrines and laws because his un-
derstanding of Islamic teachings was not directly learnt from Islamic
sources written in Arabic; but instead from sources written in English,
Dutch, and Germany languages. Soekarno’s inability to read Arabic sources
was easily found in his letter’s correspondent with A. Hasan, entitled
Surat-surat Islam dari Endeh (Letters on Islam from Endeh). In his letter
Soekarno’s says:
This day I finished reading all the books of your composing which I
have. I am very anxious to read other works from your pen. And I
should also like to read Bukhari and Muslim in Indonesian or English
translation? I really need that Bukhari and Muslim since it is there
that the hadith are collected which are called authentic. Whilst I have
read a statement from an Englishman who knows Islam, that even in
Bukhari dubious hadiths have slipped in. He also explains that the
decline of Islam, Islam’s conservativism, the pollution of Islam, the
superstition of the followers of Islam, is largely because of those dubi-
ous hadiths which are often more in demand than the verses of the
Quran. I think that opinion is correct.19
19 Soekarno, Under the Banner of Revoluion..., 310.
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From the above letter, it is clear that Soekarno admits his weakness in
reading Arabic resources. However, it is interesting from this letter to see
that Soekarno was in doubt and questioning on the authenticity of
Bukhari and Muslim collection which among Muslim are generally per-
ceived to be the most authentic Islamic sources after the Quran. It means
that Soekarno has a very progressive and critical thinking of Islamic re-
sources though his information taken from non-Arabian scholars.
Due to their concern with Soekarno’s writings which could have ‘nega-
tive’ impacts on the way Indonesian Muslim in general perceived Islam
particularly about Islam and state relationship, several Muslim scholars
at that time like Ahmad Hassan20 and Mohammad Natsir have responded
to argue against Soekarno’s ideas. Among them, Natsir was the most
articulated scholar who can be seen as a representative of Muslim group
who oppose the idea of secularism proposed by Soekarno.
Natsir: Islam as a comprehensive way of life
In response to Soekarno’s idea on separation between Islam and state,
Natsir wrote several articles which were later compiled as a book chapter
entitled Persatuan Agama Dengan Negara.21 Natsir argued against
Soekarno’s idea that Islam should be separated from the state. Natsir
believed that Islam is a way of life in which it not only guides Muslim
peoples on ritual matter (ibadah) but also on worldly matters (muamalah,
20 Hassan, a leader of Persatuan Islam (Persis) organization wrote series articles entitled
Islam dan Kebangsaan. He argued against the idea of Soekarno’s nationalism which accord-
ing to Hassan could lead to ethnic fanaticism (assabiyyah in Arabic). Hassan criticized
Soekarno who agrees with the Turkey’s and European secularism. Hassan blamed Soekarno
for his ignorant of Christian Europe tradition. European tried to separate religion and
state in their Christianity doctrine could not found how to rule the state. See Ahmad
Hassan, Islam dan Kebangsaan, Bangil: Lajnah Penerbitan Pesantren Persis Bangil, 1984,
101.
21 This book chapter can be found in Natsir’s book Agama dan Negara dalam Perspektif
Islam, Jakarta, Media Da’wah, 2001, 75-119.
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relation among the Muslims) including how to manage a state. As an
ideology, Islam rules all aspects of human life both current life (duniawi)
and life after death (ukhrawi). To describe these two duniawi (worldly) and
ukhrawi (heavenly) worlds, Natsir in his book Fiqhud Da’wah says:
“…hidup duniawi dan hidup ukhrawi itu pada hakekatnya, hanyalah
dua fase (tahapan) dari kehidupan yang satu dan kontinyu; fase yang
satu bersambungan dengan yang lain, sebagaimana bersambungannya
malam dengan siang, dan siang dengan malam, menurut hokum
peredaran angkasa dalam system yang tertentu (worldly and heavenly
lives in essence are only two steps from one continued life which are intercon-
nected like interconnection between night and day under the solar system).22
Natsir backed up his idea by citing the Quranic verse which says that
the Muslim should embrace Islam in total. The Quran says: Hai orang-
orang yang beriman, masuklah kamu ke dalam Islam secara keseluruhan.23
For Natsir, the implication of this Quranic verse means that human be-
ing is the servant of Allah (Abdullah) and should follow all Allah com-
mandments. Islam is not only religion that rules the relationship between
human being and God (hablum minallah) but also guides the relationship
among human beings themselves (hablum minan naas). Thus in the politi-
cal matter, the Muslim should hold this idea that there is no separation
between Islam and state. Natsir rejected the idea of secularism because
this idea neglected the transcendental values of Islam and it is dangerous
for Muslim life. According to Natsir, a secularist does not have a goal of
life after deaths. Natsir says:
Meskipun mungkin pada suatu saat kaum sekularis itu mengakui
keberadaan Tuhan, di dalam kehidupan kesehariannya sebagai pribadi-
pribadi sekularis tidak mengakui kebutuhan terhadap suatu hubungan
seperti itu dalam kehidupan sehari-hari dinyatakan dalam sikap-sikap,
22Mohammad Natsir, Fiqhud Da’wah, Malaysia: International Federation of Student
Organization, 1981, 12.
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tingkah laku dan tindakan-tindakan atau dalam doa ibadah...(although
sometimes the secularists people would admit the God existence, in their daily
live as a person, they do not admit their needs to have relationship with God as
can be seen from their daily acts and worship activities)24
For Natsir, the danger of secularism could be seen from the fact that
this ideology can not answer the question of what the meaning of life is.
He believes that secular persons would easily have a spiritual degenera-
tion. Secularists believe that the concept of God and religion are the
product of human creativity, not revealed by God which is not acceptable
by Islam.
In his polemic with Soekarno, Natsir argues that the reasons why people
like Soekarno does not support his idea on the unity between Islam and
state or Islamic state, because they misunderstood on the concept of Is-
lamic state which was commonly portrayed by Western scholars as nega-
tive. Natsir says:
Kalau kita terangkan bahwa agama dan negara harus bersatu, maka
terbayang sudah di mata seorang bahlul (bloody fool) duduk diatas
singgasana, dikelilingi oleh ‘haremnya’ menonton tari dayang-dayang…
Sebab beginilah gambaran pemerintahan Islam yang digambarkan
dalam kitab-kitab Eropah yang mereka baca dan diterangkan oleh
guru-guru bangsa barat selama ini. Sebab umumnya (kecuali amat
sedikit) bagi orang Eropa: Chalifah=harem; Islam=poligami. (If we ex-
plained that religion and state should be united, it would be conceived in the
eyes of a bloody fool (a secularist people), a seated-king who is surrounded by
his ladies in waiting…because that is an image of Islamic state which was
described by their books read and taught by their professors in Europe. Be-
cause generally for the European: Caliph=ladies in waiting; Islam= po-
lygamy).25
23Quran, 2: 208.
24Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornel
University Press, 1970, 215.
25Mohammad Natsir, Capita Selecta, Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973, 436.
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According to Natsir, Soekarno perceived the Osmania Empire as an
Islamic state but it was not because Turkey under the Osmania Empire
according to Natsir was un-Islamic, undemocratic and very authoritar-
ian. Thus, Soekarno’s reason that if Islam not separated from the state
could lead to authoritarian, and took Osmania Empire as an example, is
unacceptable.26 Natsir says:
Maka sekarang, kalau ada pemerintahan yang zalim yang bobrok
seperti yang ada di Turki di zaman bani Usman itu, bukanlah yang
demikian itu, yang kita jadikan contoh bila kita berkata, bahwa agama
dan negara harus bersatu. Pemerintahan yang semacam itu tidaklah
akan dapat diperbaiki dengan ‘memisahkan agama” daripadanya
seperti dikatakan Ir. Soekarno, sebab memang agama sudah lama
terpisah dari negara semacam itu (and now if there is an awful govern-
ment like Turkey under Osmania Empire, not a such government that we
refer to as an example of state that united religion and state. A bad govern-
ment like that could not be repaired by separating religion from the state as
proposed by Soekarno because in fact religion has been separated from such
government).27
Although Natsir believes in the totality of Islam as a way of life and
Indonesian state should be based on Islam, he is not against democracy.
Democracy for him is not incompatible with the idea of Islamic state. In
fact Natsir believes that Islamic state in its original form to be demo-
cratic. Thus, based on this understanding, Natsir developed a new con-
cept of what is called ‘Islamic democratic state or Theo-democracy.28  Al-
though democracy uphold the idea of people’s sovereignty which is often
contrasted with the God sovereignty in Islam, Natsir does not use this
26Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942, London; New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973, 289.
27Natsir, Capita Selecta…, 440.
28Luthfi Assyaukanie, “Democracy and the Islamic State: Muslim Arguments for Politi-
cal Change in Indonesia”, The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 20, 2004, 34.
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conflicting subject of sovereignty to reject the concept of democracy but
to limit it instead. Natsir explains:
“Barangkali orang akan berkata: Bukankah islam itu bersifat
demokrasi? Kita jawab: Islam bersifat demokrasi, dalam arti Islam itu
anti istibdad, anti absolutism, anti sewenang-wenang. Tidak berarti
persetujuan parlemen untuk penghapusan judi dan kecabulan, dan
tidak perlu dimusyawarahkan apakah perlu diadakan pemberantasan
khurafat dan kemusyrikan atu tidak, dan sebagainya. Bukan! Ini semua
bukan hak musyawarah parlemen. (“Perhaps people will ask: Is Islam
undemocratic? We answered: Islam is democratic in the sense that it is anti
dictatorship (istibdad), anti absolutism and against authoritarianism. [De-
mocracy] does not mean the parliament’s approval to abrogate [the legal sta-
tus of] gambling and pornoghraphy and to whether the myth (khurafat), idola-
try (kemusyrikan) and so on, should be discussed democratically. No! this is
not the right of Parliament to discuss).29
For Natsir, democracy cannot be removed from religious discourse. In
fact, its existence must be aimed at serving religion. Democracy which is
not guided by religion tends to be secular and thus against Islam. Differ-
ent with Soekarno’s opinion who believes that Turkey under Kemal
Ataturk was a democratic states, Natsir argued that it was not. Natsir
further stated that under Ataturk, there was only one leader in Turkey
whom was called as the Fuhrer or the Duce and there was no freedom of
the press, no freedom of thought. Even, according to Natsir, Halida Edib
herself who had often been quoted by Soekarno had to flee from Turkey
to avoid arrest by the Kemal authoritarian government.30
The polemic between Soekarno and Natsir on the relationship be-
tween Islam and state and how should Indonesian based on its state ide-
ology have continued prior to and following its independence. In the
29Mohammad  Natsir, Agama dan Negara dalam Perspektif Islam, Jakarta: Media Dakwah,
2001, 89.
30 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement..., 292.
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lead up to Indonesian independence, the discourse consisted mainly of
an ideological contest about whether Islam or nationalism should form
the ideological basis of the new state Indonesia. This debate between
kebangsaan group and Islamic group on this issue prior to Independence
can be clearly found in their debate on the Jakarta.
Debate on Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta)
Effendy noted that the serious debate between Islamic and kebangsaan
groups prior to the Indonesian independence, was occurred in BPUPKI
(Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, In-
vestigatory Committee for Efforts for the Preparation of Indonesian In-
dependence)31 meetings.32 BPUPKI was established on 29 April 1945 by
the Japanese. In their meetings held from late May to mid-August 1945,
the former (Muslim groups) argued that Indonesia should become Islamic
state, while the latter (kebangsaan) proposed the creation of a national
unitary state in which the affairs of the state should be separated from
the affairs of religion (Islam).
To compromise between two conflicting groups, a sub committee con-
sisting of nine members was formed. After serious discussions among the
members consists of Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, A.A. Maramis,
Abikusno Tjokrosedjoso, Abdul kahar Muzakkir, H. Agus Salim, Ahmad
Soebardjo, A. Wahid Hasjim and Muhammad Yamin, the agreement
among them were reached. They agreed that the five principles known
31 This committee consisted of sixty two members. Out of this number, at most only
eleven seemed to represent the Islamic group. They included Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Abdul
Kahar Muzakkir, H. Agus Salim, K.H. Abdul Halim, K.H. Masjkur, H. Ahmad Sanusi, K.H.
Mas Mansjur, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Sukiman, K.H. A. Wachid Hasjim and A. Baswedan.
See Bachtiar Effendy Islam and the State..., 57 and for a complete list of the members see
Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Vol. 1 Jakarta: Yayasan
Prapanca, 1959, 60.
32 Effendy, Islam and the State..., 30.
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as Pancasila would become the Indonesia ideology and appeared in the
Preamble of the Indonesian Constitutions. These five principles were
the belief in God with the obligation to implement sharia for its adher-
ents; a just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; a democracy
guided by wisdom arising from consultation and representations; and
social justice for the whole Indonesian people. Signed by the nine-mem-
ber committee in Jakarta on 22 June 1945, this draft of Preamble was
popularly known as the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta).
The above agreement among the subcommittee members could be seen
as a good compromise between these two opposing groups. On the one
hand, the draft accommodated kebangsaan group that Indonesia was not to
be Islamic state and on the other hand, the draft recognized Muslims as
majority by granting them the right to implement their own law which is
clearly stated in the preamble ‘dengan kewajiban menjalankan shariat Islam
bagi pemeluknya (with the obligation to implement the Islamic sharia for its
adherents).33 Unfortunately, on 18 August 1945, one day after Indonesian
independence, in the meeting of PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan
Indonesia, the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence)
headed by Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta, the seven words from the
first principle of Pancasila in the Jakarta Charter (dengan kewajiban
menjalankan shariat Islam bagi pemeluknya) was omitted.34 Since that time,
the first principle of Pancasila which was written in the Preamble of Indo-
33During a discussion in the committee, Wachid Hasjim of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)
had proposed that the adherence to Islam as one of the qualifications to be eligible for the
President or the Vice President of Indonesia. This proposal was rejected by the committee.
Soekarno at that time argued that since Islam is the majority, the President would obviously
be a Muslim without necessarily mentioned this clausal in the constitution. See Muhammad
Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-undang Dasar 1945, Vol. 1, Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca,
1959, 261-263.
34According to B. J. Bolan as quoted by Hosen, it was said that a Japanese officer of the
Kaigun (Japanese navy) came to Muhammad Hatta to tell him that a Christian representa-
tive from Eastern Indonesia objected to the clause of sharia. He was warned that should it
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nesian constitution 1945 (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945) was only the Be-
lief in One, Supreme God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa).
Soekarno has convinced the Muslim leaders at that time that this
constitution only a temporal one and Muslim could amend the text in
the future through constitutional procedure. He says:
“Gentlemen, all of you realize that the Constitution we decide today
(18 August 1945) is a temporary constitution. If I may I would like to
use the words ‘a lighting constitution’. At a later time when the state
is in a peaceful and calm situation we would certainly bring together
the members of the People’s Assembly to make more complete and
perfect Constitution.35
Soekarno’s statement above has made Muslim leaders at that time to
believe that when the general elections come the issue could be discussed
again. As majority, according to Boland, they believed that their groups would
achieve the majority vote which would lead them to insert the seven words
omitted constitutionally.36 However, there are several Muslim leaders who
felt betrayed by this omission.37 Isa Anshary for example commented on this
omission saying that this event to be tantamount to dishonest politics.38 Natsir
be kept unchanged, he and his people (non Muslim from Eastern Indonesia) would sepa-
rate from the Republic of Indonesia. Hatta was influenced by this message and promised to
bring the message to the meeting. See, Hosen, Syariah and Constitutional Reform…, 89.
35See Hosen, Syariah and Constitutional Reform..., 91.
36B.J. Boland,  The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,
1982, 37.
37The Constitution was convinced by Soekarno as a temporary one could be easily
found in Soekarno’s speech, saying: “gentlemen, all of you realize that the Constitution we
decide today (18 August 1945) is a temporary constitution. If I may I would like to use the
words ‘ a lighting constitution’. At a later time when the state is in a peaceful and calm
situation we would certainly bring together the members of the People’s Assembly to make
more complete and perfect Constitution. See Yamin as quoted by Hosen, Syariah and
Constitutional Reform..., 91.
38See Endang Saefuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the
Gentlemen’s Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia,
M.A. thesis, McGill University, Canada, 1976, 42.
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comments on this omission as a great sacrifice of Muslim to the country
for the Indonesian unity.39 Agreed with Natsir’s argument, Alamsjah
describes this moment as ‘the greatest gift and sacrifice of the humble
Indonesian Muslims as majority population for the sake of Indonesian
national unity and integrity.40
Since its omission, the missing words of the Piagam Jakarta have never
been ended discussed by Muslim politicians through Indonesian political
history. In facts Muslim groups have persistently called for re-inclusion of
the Piagam Jakarta in the Constitution, ever since those words were
dropped in 1945.
Nurcholish Madjid : Islam Yes, Partai Islam, No!
The efforts of Soeharto regime to marginalize Muslims from politics in
his early presidency up to late 1980s have paved the way some Muslim
intellectuals to look at an alternative way in their struggle for political
Islam to survive. They tried to develop a new format for political Islam in
which substance, rather than form, serves as their primary orientations.
In regard with the idea of the proper relationship between Islam and
state, these intellectuals not only discussed how their political direction
and objective should be but most importantly they also re-think their
fundamental theological foundation for political Islam to involve in In-
donesian politics. Effendy says:
Their agenda requires (1) re-examination of the theological or philo-
sophical underpinnings of political Islam; (2) redefinition of political
objectives of Islam; and (3) reassessment of the ways by which those
political ideals can be effectively realized.41
39Mohammad Natsir, “Pengorbanan Umat Islam Sangat Besar”, Panji Masyarakat, 11
June 1987,  28.
40See Pelita (Indonesian daily newspaper), 12 June 1978.
41Effendy, Islam and the State…, 66.
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These new intellectuals believed that the strategy conveyed by old
Muslim generations like Natsir and his proponents as discussed previ-
ously, should be reconsidered. They particularly challenged the ideas of
previous Muslim political activists who hold an idea that the state is an
integral part of Islam or Islam is a way of life (ideology). These new gen-
erations have called to rejuvenate of Islamic thought and understanding.
They believed that Muslims understandings or interpretations of two main
sources of Islam (Quran and Hadith) are subject to change and they urged
Muslims to rethink their interpretation of Islam to reconcile with social
and contemporary political development in Indonesia.42 It is however,
important to note that the basic idea of these Muslim intellectuals was
not new in Indonesian history because it has been previously expressed
by Soekarno in pre-Independence period particularly in his polemic with
Natsir.
The ideas of theological renewal and rejuvenation of religious Islamic
understanding was cantered around the figures like Nurcholish Madjid
(Cak Nur), Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Djohan
Effendy, Ahmad Wahib and M Dawam Rahardjo. Among them, Cak
Nur could be seen as the most outspoken figures of these new intellectu-
als. Thus, elaborating Cak Nur; ideas is important here not only because
of his figure as an Indonesian modernist thinkers ‘icon’ during Soeharto’s
era and beyond, but also due to his thought’s influence which in the later
development has inspired other young generations to follow the same
path.
The late Nurcholish Madjid, known as Cak Nur, is one of the most
influential neo-modernist Islam thinkers in Indonesian history. Born in
Mojoanyar, Jombang, East Java on March 17, 1939, he was the rector of
42 Effendy, Islam and the State…, 69.
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Paramadina University in Jakarta and a professor in Islamic studies at the
State Islamic University, (Universitas Islam Negeri) Syarif Hidayatullah,
Jakarta. He is known as a prolific writer who has published dozens of
books and hundred of articles in various academic journals. He obtained
his PhD degree in philosophy from the University of Chicago with his
thesis entitled, “Ibnu Taimiya on Kalam and Falsafah: Problems on Reasons
and Revelation in Islam” under supervision of Fazlur Rahman. His elemen-
tary to high school education was in traditional Islamic boarding schools.
He went to his father’s religious school al-Wathoniyah madrasah for el-
ementary education and continued his at the Darul Ulum pesantren in
Rejoso, Jombang. His high school education was in the Pondok Modern
Darussalam (modern Islamic boarding School) in Gontor, where he com-
pleted his Islamic education in 1960. Then, he moved to Jakarta and
enrolled in the Faculty of Islamic Literature and Culture at the State
Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Syarif Hidayatullah where he obtained
his bachelor degree in Arabic Literature in 1968.
The young Nurcholish Madjid was an Islamic activist. While he was
studying at IAIN, he was elected as the general chairman of Himpunan
Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) or Islamic Student Association, for two consecu-
tive periods, 1966-1969 and 1969-1971. He was the only chairman who
holds this position for more than one period in this organization’s his-
tory; although he often said that it was a historical accident that made
him hold the chairmanship for two periods.
His intellectual reputation soared in the public eye following his con-
troversial speech on January 2, 1970, entitled Keharusan Pembaharuan
Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat (The Necessity of Renew-
ing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummah). This
speech was controversial because Madjid argued for the need for a liber-
alization process in the teachings and views of Islam. For Madjid, the
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liberalization of outlook towards the present teachings of Islam in Indo-
nesia should involve secularization, intellectual freedom and the idea of
progress and open attitudes. In his account, that process is needed to
allow renewal of Islam so it can free “[itself] from traditional values” and
“seek values which are oriented toward the future”.43 Madjid offered the
straightforward observation that Indonesian Muslims suffered stagnation
in religious thinking and had lost the “psychological striking force” in their
struggle.44 An important indication of this intellectually disarticulated In-
donesian Muslim, as observed by Madjid, was the inability of the vast ma-
jority of Muslims to differentiate values which were transcendental from
those which were temporal. In fact, he pointed out further that the hierar-
chy of values was often the reverse; transcendental values were conceived
as temporal and vice versa. Everything was likely to be perceived as tran-
scendental, and therefore, without exception, valued as divine. As a result
of this mode of religiosity, “Islam is [viewed as] equal in value and tradi-
tions; and becoming Islamic is comparable to being traditionalist”.45
In his paper, moreover, Madjid wrapped his ideas in a highly contro-
versial jargon, that is, sekularisasi (secularization). The controversy over
his speech forced him to write Beberapa Catatan Sekitar Masalah
Pembaharuan Pemikiran dalam Islam (Some Notes on Renewing Islamic
Thought) and Sekali Lagi tentang Sekularisasi (One more Time about Secu-
larization) in 1972.46 In both writings, he clarified his position on secular-
43 Nurcholish Madjid. “The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of
the Integration of the Ummah”, in Charles Kurzman, (ed.), Liberal Islam: A Source Book,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 286. See also Nurcholish Madjid. The True Face
of Islam: Essays on Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Jakarta: Voice Center Indonesia, 2003,
317.
44 Madjid, The True Face of Islam…, 287.
45 Madjid, The True Face of Islam…, 288.
46 These two essays are included in Majid’s book Islam Kemoderenan dan Keindonesiaan,
Bandung: Mizan, 1987, 215-256.
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ization, which had been attacked by many Indonesian Muslim scholars
who argued that secularization without secularism is impossible. In de-
fending his position, Madjid first elaborated upon the etymology of the
word “secular” and its neutral meaning. He firmly believed that secular-
ization is possible and an obligation of all religious human being, espe-
cially Muslims, as this is in accordance with the teaching of Islam. Madjid
argued that secularization is inevitably a realization of the primary Is-
lamic oath (syahadat) which states that there is no God but Allah and
Muhammad is His Prophet. By professing that there is no God but Al-
lah, Muslims must be critical of all Islamic interpretations in order to
avoid absolutism, because the only absolute thing is God.
As indicated in his paper, his concept of ‘sekularisasi’ was borrowed
from Harvey Cox, a respected American theologian who maintains that
secularization is different from secularism. Cox defines secularization as
“the liberation of man from religious and metaphysical tutelage, the turn-
ing of his attention away from other worlds and toward this one”.47 Thus,
according to Effendy, it was the notion of “liberating development” as
well as the “clear distinction between secularization and secularism” which
Madjid employed in articulating his ideas concerning the logical conse-
quences of Islamic monotheism (al-tawhid).48 This can be seen from notes
that Madjid he put in his paper:
Secularization does not mean the application of secularism, because
“secularism is the name for an ideology, a new closed world view which
functions very much like a new religion”. What is meant here is any
form of “liberating development”…Thus, “secularization” does not
mean to apply secularism or to transform Muslim into secularist. What
47Harvey Cox. The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective,
New York: Macmillan Company, 1966, 17.
48Effendy, Islam and the State..., 73.
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is intended is to “temporalize values, which are in fact temporal, and
to free Muslims from the tendency to spiritualize these values.49
With his statement above, Madjid not only provided an explanation
what he meant by secularization, but at the same time he also recon-
firmed his position opposing the notion of “secularism”. The term “secu-
larization” was meant as necessary process that would enable the Islamic
community to distinguish between transcendental and temporal values.
For Madjid, ‘secularization” understood as process of liberating develop-
ment, is also a conditio sine qua non to facilitate Muslims, in accordance
with their function as vicegerents of God (khalifat al-Allah fi al-ardh) in
their endeavors to relate the universalism of Islam to today’s Indonesia.50
Although Madjid still remained faithful to the substance of his re-
newal ideas, after he obtained his PhD from Chicago in 1980s, he no
longer employs the controversial term “secularization”. Instead, Madjid
has been able to smoothly rephrase the term “secularization” as “radical
devaluation” or “desacralization”. This change, Effendy notes, could be
inspired by indirect intellectual encouragement of similar understanding
of “secularization” that is promoted by influential sociologists such as
Talcott Parsons and Robert N. Bellah.51 Madjid believes that there is
nothing sacred about the matters of an Islamic state, Islamic political
parties, or Islamic ideology. Accordingly, Muslim should be able to “secu-
larize” or “desacralize” their perceptions on those worldly issues. In the
light of this, he introduced the phrase: “Islam Yes, Partai Islam No” (Islam
Yes, Islamic Party, No!). With this jargon, among other things, he encour-
aged his fellow Muslims to direct their commitment to Islamic values and
not to institutions, even those of Islamic origin such as Islamic parties.
49Madjid, The True Face of Islam…, 317.
50Effendy, Islam and the State…, 73.
51Effendy, Islam and the State…, 73.
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If Islamic organizations represent the vehicles for Islamic ideas, ac-
cording to Barton, why is it, Madjid asked that people are not attracted
to Islamic organizations?52 The reasons, Madjid argues, are obvious that
Islamic organizations are no longer attracting the kind of mass support
that they once did. This support declined because the nature of the thought
that these organizations represent and disseminate has become stale; and
it was also caused by the fact that Islamic parties and their leaders have
lost credibility in the eyes of the public. Madjid says:
The answer to the above question can be found by asking the follow-
ing question: to what extent are they attracted to Islamic parties and
organizations? Except a few, it is obvious that they are not attracted to
Islamic parties or organizations. Thus, their attitudes might more or
less be expressed through the saying: “Islam, Yes; Islamic Party, No!”.
If Islamic parties are regarded as the vessels of ideas, which are going
to be fought for on the basis of Islam, then these ideas are now obvi-
ously unappealing.53
Madjid’s search for a contextual Indonesian Islamic theology draws
upon his understanding of what he calls the underlying “spirit” of Islam.
Like other Muslim liberals, he makes a distinction between the “spirit”
and the “textual” of religious traditions insisting that the former must be
given primacy over the latter. He sees this new perspective as emanating
from the process of ijtihad which he defines as “a method of rational and
realistic interpretation of Islam” based on the principles of “public inter-
est”.54 If equality and social justice are cardinal pillars of Islam, then, he
says, developing new way of imaging Islamic law through ijtihad are re-
quired in order to realize core Islamic values in today’s context; although
this does not mean that tradition must be wholly jettisoned.
52Barton, Greg. Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta: Equi-
nox Publishing, 2002, 124..
53Madjid, The True Face of Islam…, 316.
54Madjid, The True Face of Islam…, 60.
88
IJIMS, Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 6, Number 1, June  2016: 63-92
Madjid continued working on renewal Islamic thought in Indonesia
until his departure on August 29, 2005 which was considered by Indone-
sian, particularly Muslim, as a great lost of “bapak bangsa” or the father of
nation. In his article following Madjid’s departure, Barton says:
Indonesia, home to some of the most significant progressive Islamic
ideas in the modern period has lost one of its greatest thinkers just when
he was needed most. The untimely death last week of Nurcholish Madjid
(66), a leading advocate for a tolerant and peaceful understanding of
Islam, after a long struggle with Hepatitis, has been noted not only across
Indonesia, where he was given a state funeral, but also around the world.55
Madjid’s ideas and struggles in renewing Islamic thought in Indonesia
have influenced young Indonesian Muslims to follow his step. His legacy
and influence can be seen in his many young liberal and progressive
Muslim intellectual cadres in Indonesia. According to Bruinessen, the
role of provocative, innovative and liberating thinker and broker of ideas
that he played for his own generation is now played by a highly varied
group of younger men and women, in various institutions, NGOs and
informal networks in Indonesia.56
Concluding Remarks
From the lengthy discussion presented above, it is safe to argue that
Muslims both individuals and institutions have actively involved in the
struggle for democracy in Indonesia since early Indonesian state estab-
lishment up to present. Their struggle for democracy has been colored by
the resentment between political Islam and the state which was largely
due to Muslims formalistic quest for Indonesian Islamic state on the one
55Greg Barton, “Peaceful Islam and Nurcholish’s Lasting Legacy, the Jakarta Post, Sep-
tember 6, 2005.
56Martin van Bruinessen. “Nurcholish Madjid: Indonesian Muslim Intellectual, in ISIM
Review 17 (Spring 2006), 23.
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hand as proposed by Natsir and state’s conceptualization of a national-
unitary construct of state with Pancasila as its ideology as suggested by
Soekarno.
This antagonism above, however, has been changed when the new
Muslims intellectuals promoted their struggle to more focus on substance
rather than the form as their predecessors requested as can be seen from
the view of Madjid. And after the Soeharto’s out of offices, the tendency of
several Muslim radical groups have tried to return back to their formalistic
inquiry such as inclusion of Islamic sharia into Indonesian constitution
which was finally responded by young Muslim generations post-Madjid.
Madjid’s search for a contextual Indonesian Islamic theology draws
upon his understanding of what he calls the underlying “spirit” of Islam.
Like other Muslim liberals, he makes a distinction between the “spirit”
and the “textual” of religious traditions insisting that the former must be
given primacy over the latter.
Madjid seems to propose the middle path between Soekarno and
Natsir in his struggle to ‘Islamize’ Indonesia. On the one hand, Madjid
opposes the idea of making Indonesia an Islamic state, consistently argu-
ing that if Islam is instituzionalized in the state, it will go against the
plurality of Indonesian society and will marginalize many minorities which
would lead inevitably to national disintegration. On the other hand,
Madjid also refuses that Indonesian become totally a secular state. Madjid’s
new perspective has been emanated from the process of ijtihad which he
defines as “a method of rational and realistic interpretation of Islam”
based on the principles of “public interest”.57
Finally, the debate among the Indonesian leading figures above is
important due to its style and impact on the Muslim communities at that
57Bruinessen. “Nurcholish Madjid”…, 60.
90
IJIMS, Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 6, Number 1, June  2016: 63-92
time. On the one hand, although these three figures have a very sharp
different opinion on the issue, they debate the issue politely and in a
democratic way. Natsir for example did not label Soekarno as murtad
(apostasy) or kafir (infidel) even though Soekarno did not agree with his
idea of Islamic state. On the other hand, the polemic had contributed to
the awareness among Muslim communities at that time that Islam not
only manage and related to theology and hereafter (akhirat) issues but
also Islam concerns with individual, social, culture and state issues. It is
also important to note here that the discourse of democratization in In-
donesia could become the place for the Muslim, who rejected the ideas
of integration between religion and state, to play their role. And at the
same time, in its democracy discourse, Islam would still have a public
arena to develop dynamically in the name of Indonesian democratiza-
tion process.
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